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Bopp: The Law of Privilege: Obstacles on the Road to Recognition

THE LAW OF PRIVILEGE: OBSTACLES
ON THE ROAD TO RECOGNITION
In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied,
Rubin v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 461 (1998)
Kelly S. Bopp*
Appellant, the Secretary of the Treasury,' attempted to prevent United
States Secret Service officers from being compelled to testify before ' a2
federal grand jury by invoking the "protective function privilege.
Appellee, the Office of the Independent Counsel, sought to compel the
testimony as part of its presidential investigation. 3 Appellant asserted that
the information sought by appellee included observations made and
statements overheard while protecting the President and thus, should be
protected by the privilege.4 The Secret Service alleged that the privilege
was necessary to carry out its statutory duty of protecting the President. 5
Arguing that it would enhance presidential security, the Secret Service
asserted that the privilege would "lessen[] any tendency of the President to
'push away' his protectors" in an'effort to secure privacy.6 Appellee argued
that recognition of the privilege would undermine congressional intent as
expressed in 28 U.S.C. 535(b).7 The United States District Court for the

* The author would like to dedicate this Case Comment to her mother, father, and sister for
their confidence, support, and love.
1. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Rubin v. United
States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998). Appellant was responsible for overseeing the Secret Service. See id.
2. Id.The asserted privilege sought to "absolutely protect[] 'information obtained by Secret
Service personnel while performing their protective function in physical proximity to the
President."' Id. at 1075. Testimony "concerning observations or statements that, at the time they
were made, were sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a felony ha[d] been,
[wa]s being, or... [would] be committed" was not said to be privileged. Id.
3. See id Apparently, this was the first attempt in the history of the United States to compel
the testimony of officers guarding the President. See id. at 1076.
4. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148, 1998 WL 272884, at *1 (D.D.C. 1998),
aff'd by 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Grand Jury Proceedings1].
5. See GrandJury Proceedings!, 148 F.3d at 1076. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3056-(a)(1)
(West 1998). This statute provides, in relevant part: "Under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury, the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect... [tihe President, the Vice
President (or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of President), the Presidentelect, and the Vice President-elect." Id.
6. Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076. The Secret Service submitted declarations by former
senior agents and a letter from President Bush supporting the privilege. See id. at 1076.
7. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)
(1998) (imposingadutyon all executive branch personnel to report criminal activity by government
officers and employees to the Attorney General).
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District of Columbia refused to recognize the privilege because it did not
have federal or state history.8 The district court also found that the Secret
Service arguments were not strong enough to overcome the interest in
obtaining evidence.9 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded
that the Secret Service failed to show the necessity of the privilege 0 by a
clear and convincing standard required under Federal Rule of Evidence
501.1' Thus, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the district court and HELD, that the protective function privilege could
not protect the officers from being compelled to testify."
Historically, courts have valued the adversarial demand for probative
evidence and have been reluctant to recognize new evidentiary privileges. 3
For instance, in Trammel v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court determined that the need for probative evidence outweighed the
justification for the marital evidentiary privilege.' 4 In Trammel, the
defendant sought to invoke the marital privilege to prevent his wife from
testifying against him about his involvement in a conspiracy. 5 The district
court refused to allow the defendant full protection of the marital privilege

8. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *2. The district court reasoned that
the Supreme Court only recognized a new privilege "when the privilege had some history in federal
law and enjoyed broad state support, and public policy considerations weighed strongly in favor
of recognizing it." Id. The court found that the protective function privilege satisfied none of the
above. See id.
9. See SealedCase, 148 F.3d at 1074; see also GrandJuryProceedings,1998 WL 272884,
at *5.
10. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076. The United States Court of Appeals stated that
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 required showing the need for the privilege with compelling clarity.
See id.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 501. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides in pertinent part that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress... ' the privilege of a witness ...shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
Id.
12. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079.
13. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The courts
have rejected new privileges in an effort to adhere to the principle that evidentiary privileges are
in derogation of the search for truth. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Trammel v. United
States, 100 S. Ct. 906,912 (1980). Courts have held that privileges "must be strictly construed and
accepted 'only to... [a] very limited extent!" in order to preserve the principle that the public has
a right to every man's evidence. Trammel, 100 S. Ct. at 912 (citations omitted).
14. See Trammel, 100 S. Ct. at 913.
15. See id. at 908. In Trammel, the prosecution called the defendant's wife as an adverse
witness. See id. The defendant's wife voluntarily testified, in detail, about her role and the role of
the defendant in a heroin distribution conspiracy. See id.
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and permitted his wife to testify for the prosecution.16 In reaching its
pretrial ruling, the district court reasoned that the marital privilege only
protected confidential communications between a husband and wife.17 At
trial, defendant was found guilty."8 In affirming the district court's
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected defendant's claim, holding that the privilege did not
prohibit voluntary testimony of a spouse. 9 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider whether the interest promoted by the
spousal privilege was sufficiently important to outweigh the need for
probative evidence.20
The Trammel Court emphasized the ability of the federal judiciary to
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis21 and according to the
reason and experience logic under Rule 501. Nevertheless, the Court
recognized that the marital privilege had an established history dating back
to medieval times.' According to the Court, the privilege was formulated
to protect confidential communications between husband and wife and to
foster the harmony and sanctity of marriage.23 However, the Court
rationalized that when one spouse volunteers to testify against the other,
the marital harmony is already broken, leaving nothing to preserve.24 Thus,
the purpose of the privilege would not be served by applying it to such
situations.'
In Trammel, the Court found that the privilege substantially interfered
with the fundamental principle of ascertaining the truth.26 Moreover, the
purpose of the marital privilege would not be served in the instant case.2
The Trammel Court concluded that the "'reason and experience"' logic
under Rule 501 did not justify recognition of a privilege against adverse

16. See id. The district court held that confidential communications between the defendant
and his wife were protected by the marital privilege. See i. However, the district court found that
any observations the wife made during the marriage and any conversations she had with the
defendant in the presence of a third person, were not protected by the privilege. See id.

17. See .
18. Seeid.
19. See id.at 909. The wife in Trammel appeared as an unindicted co-conspiratorunder grant
of immunity from the Government in return for her testimony. See id.
20. See id at 908.
21. Seeid. at910.
22. See id. at 909.
23. See id. at 913. The spousal privilege originated, first, from the rule that an accused was
not allowed to testify on his own behalf, and second, from the understanding that a husband and
wife were one and the same. See id.at 909.
24. See i. at913.
25. See id.
26. See it.
27. See i. The Court found that the ancient foundations on which the privilege was based
were no longer applicable in contemporary society. See i.
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spousal testimony.28
The United States Supreme Court also addressed the law of evidentiary
privilege in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.29 In University of
Pennsylvania (Penn), respondent, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, was conducting an investigation of charges that petitioner
had determined tenure awards in a racially and sexually discriminatory
manner." Petitioner, the University of Pennsylvania, sought to invoke a
new privilege protecting peer review materials utilized in making tenure
decisions.3
Asserting that the confidentiality of the peer review process was a
necessary function of many colleges and universities, petitioner urged that
it should be protected by a privilege.32 Respondent argued that the peer
review materials were necessary to conduct a thorough investigation of the
charges.33 The Penn Court, like the Trammel Court, required petitioner to
demonstrate a sufficiently important interest that would outweigh the need
for probative evidence.'
The Court determined that petitioner's asserted justification for the
privilege, confidentiality of the peer review process, was an insufficient
objective because it left uncertain whether failure to recognize the privilege
would actually hinder the peer review process.35 Additionally, the Penn
Court emphasized that Congress had not recognized a privilege protecting
peer review materials.36 The Court asserted that it would "stand behind the
breakwater Congress ha[d] established" and avoid recognizing a privilege
that Congress had not previously identified. Thus, because Congress had
not identified a privilege that would apply to peer review materials, the

28.
29.
30.
her and,

Id. at 914.
110 S. Ct. 577,578 (1990).
See id. at 580. Respondent charged that the department chairman had sexually harassed
because she did not accept his advances, wrote a negative letter to the tenure-review

committee. See id.
31. See id. The materials to be disclosed were the tenure-review files of the professor alleging
discrimination and those files of five male faculty members identified as having received more
favorable treatment on account of their race and sex. See id.
32. See id. at 582. The appellant argued that these institutions are exceptional because they
foster learning, discovery and innovation. See id. Also, the appellant rationalized that if peer
evaluations were disclosed and made public, a "'chilling effect"' on candid evaluations would
result. Id. at 586.
33. See id. at 580. The Commission found that the petitioner did not supply enough data to
determine whether there was reasonable cause to believe the allegations of discrimination. See id.
at 580-81.
34. See id. at 582 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
35. See id. at 587.
36. See id. at 584. Congress did address situations in which an employer would have an
interest in the confidentiality of its records but these did not include peer review materials. See id.
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Penn Court refused to recognize the privilege.37
Six years after it decided Penn, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the first evidentiary privilege under Rule 501 in Jaffee v.
Redmond.38 In Jaffee, defendant sought to invoke a psychotherapist-patient
privilege.39 The asserted privilege would prevent the disclosure of
confidential communications made by a patient to a clinical social worker
during counseling sessions.4 The Jaffee Court found that a novel privilege
may be justified if the public good outweighed the need for probative
evidence. 4 The Court reasoned that successful psychiatric treatments
depended upon patients' abilities to talk freely with their
psychotherapists.42 According to the Court, appropriate treatment for
individuals suffering from mental or emotional problems was a
substantially important public good.43
The Jaffee Court further reasoned that a psychotherapist-patient
privilege was justified by the fact that all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had enacted some form of the privilege.' The Court rationalized
that consensus among state legislatures satisfied the "'reason and
experience"' logic under Rule 501.4' Holding that the privilege promoted
important public interests which outweighed the need for probative
evidence, the Jaffee Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege.'
In the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit departed from previous interpretations of Rule 501.'7
Like the Jaffee Court, the instant court found that judicial recognition of
a new privilege depended upon whether the privilege would enhance a
public good.48 However, the instant court held that Rule 501 required the
Secret Service to demonstrate the need for the protective function privilege

37. Id. at 585. The Court rationalized that Congress itself could revise the statute. See id.
38. 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1932(1996).
39. See id. at 1926. The defendant, a former police officer, pursued counseling after she shot
and killed an individual while on patrol duty. See i. at 1925. The individual was the subject of the
estate commencing the action. See id.
40. See id. The materials sought in Jaffee were notes concerning 50 counseling sessions for
use in cross-examining the defendant. See id.
41. See id. at 1931.
42. See id. at 1928. The Court asserted that communications made during counseling sessions
may contain embarrassing or disgraceful information due to the sensitive nature of the underlying
problems which compel counseling in the first place. See id
43. See id. at 1929. Determining the public good implemented by the privilege, the Court
found that the mental health of the citizenry was no less important than its physical health. See id.

44. See id.
45. Id. at 1930.
46. See id. at 1928.
47. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Rubin v. United
States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
48. See id. (citation omitted).
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by a "clear and convincing" standard.49
In an attempt to meet this standard, the Secret Service argued that, in
the absence of such a privilege, the President would be inclined to push
away his protectors when seeking privacy.5" The Secret Service alleged that
this avoidance of protection would endanger the President.5 The instant
court acknowledged that the safety of the President constituted a public
good and that it was the duty of the Secret Service to ensure the President's
safety. 52 However, the court found that the Secret Service's arguments
failed to "clearly and convincingly" demonstrate that an absence of the
privilege would endanger the President.53 The court concluded that if such
a privilege were appropriate, it would have to be recognized by Congress.54
In reaching its holding, the instant court departed from the language of
Rule 501.55 Rule 501 authorizes courts to accept new privileges according
to the principles of the common law and in light of reason and
experience.56 Asserting that Rule 501 required a compelling justification
for recognition of an evidentiary privilege, the instant court extrapolated
a "clear and convincing" standard of proof from Rule 501.5 However, the
is not written in Rule 50158 and previous
"clear and convincing" standard
59
courts have not utilized it.
Prior cases have applied Rule 501 without the "clear and convincing"
standard. 6 The Trammel Court, for example, measured the persuasiveness
of an asserted privilege against the need for probative evidence without
requiring the defendant to justify the privilege by a "clear and convincing"

49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id. In addition, the Secret Service argued that incoming Presidents generally do not
appreciate security risks. See id. at 1077.
52. See id. at 1076.
53. Id. (adding that "vague fears extrapolated beyond any foreseeable threae' were
insufficient) (citation omitted).
54. See id. at 1079. The instant court stated that if Congress decided a protective function
privilege were appropriate to protect the President, then Congress should define the "contours" of
the privilege. Id.
55. See id. at 1076. The instant court stated that recognition of the privilege depended
"entirely upon the Secret Service's ability to establish clearly and convincingly both the need for
and the efficacy of the proposed privilege." Id. However, the language of Rule 501 does not contain
the "clear and convincing" legal standard. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
56. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076.
57. See id. Reiterating the application of the standard, the instant court asserted that the
Supreme Court required a party seeking recognition of an evidentiary privilege to demonstrate its
need with a high degree of clarity and certainty. See id.
58. See FED. RULES OFEVID. 501.
59. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075; see also Trammel v. Unitid States, 100 S. Ct. 906,
911 (1980); Penn, 110 S. Ct. at 189; Jaffee, 116, S. Ct. at 1927.
60. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
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standard.61 Instead, the Trammel Court referred to reason and experience
as decision-making tools for analyzing a new privilege. 62 The phrase
"reason and experience" came directly from the language of Rule 501.63
Applying the "reason and experience" standard, the Trammel Court
determined that the purpose of a marital privilege would not be served by
prohibiting voluntary spousal testimony. 6'
Quoting Rule 501, the instant court mentioned "reason and experience"
only once in its opinion. 65 Retreating from the principal holding espoused
by the Trammel Court, the instant court based its holding on the Secret
Service's failure to carry its heavy burden of proof rather than what was
dictated by reason and experience.' By declining to utilize the reason and
experience logic under Rule 501, as the Court did in Trammel, the instant
court confined the Secret Service to its clear and convincing
demonstration.67 This restraint significantly narrowed the grounds for
recognition of the protective function privilege.
Additionally, by requiring the heavy burden of a clear and convincing
standard of proof, the instant court substantially decreased the chances that
a privilege without history could be invoked. 6' The Jaffee Court, for
instance, did not require this heavy burden of proof.69 In Jaffee, the Court
rationalized that successful psychiatric treatment was a public good
justifying the privilege.70 Additionally, the Jaffee Court held that state
acceptance of the psychotherapist-patient privilege satisfied the reason and
61. See Trammel, 100 S. Ct. at 912. The Trammel Court observed that Congress, by enacting
Rule 501, manifested an affirmative intention to not freeze the law of privilege. See id.at 911. In
Trammel, the issue to be decided was whether the privilege against spousal testimony promoted
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence. See id. at 912.
62. See id. at 914; see also id. at 912 (Stewart, J., concurring). The concurring opinion in
Trammel identified that the Court refused to recognize the proposed privilege because of thechange
in perception that "reason and experience" prescribed. Id. (Stewart, J. concurring).
63. See id. at 910; see also FED. R. EViD. 501.
64. See Trammel, 100 S. Ct. at 914.
65. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Rubin v. United States,
119 S. CL 461 (1998) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
66. See id. at 1079. The instant court held that the Secret Service failed to carry its heavy
burden of establishing the need for the protective function privilege it sought to assert. See id.
67. See id. at 1076. The court rationalized that the Secret Service had to demonstrate, clearly
and convincingly, that recognition of the privilege would materially enhance presidential security.
See id.
68. See id. at 1079. Deciding the instant case, the court asserted that it was a heavy burden
which the Secret Service failed to establish. See id.
69. SeeJaffeev. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996). TheJaffeeCourtreasonedthatthe
law of privilege may be dictated by reason and experience. See id.
70. See id. at 1928. The Jaffee Court cited to briefs from the American Psychiatric
Association and American Psychological Association. See id The Court formed its own rationale
that the possibility of psychotherapist disclosure may impede development of the confidential
relationship for successful treatment. See id.
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experience logic under Rule 501.71
Similar to the Jaffee Court, the instant court embraced the purpose of
the privilege72 and accepted the Secret Service's argument that the safety
of the President constituted a public good of utmost importance. 3
However, the instant court went further than the Jaffee Court and
demanded that the Secret Service clearly and convincingly establish the
connection between the purpose and the privilege.74 The instant court held
that the Secret Service failed to meet the clear and convincing standard
because the arguments that the purpose of the privilege would be served
were speculative.75 However, the arguments of the Secret Service appeared
no less conclusive than the reasoning of the Court in Jaffee.7 6 The critical
difference between the two cases was that the privilege in the instant case
was a novelty77 and the privilege discussed in Jaffee had a history of state

legislation.78

Ultimately, by injecting a clear and convincing standard into Rule 501,
the instant court would reject any novel privilege which lacked historical
consideration, absent compelling proof that the privilege would indeed
further a public good. 79 According to the instant court, speculated

assertions alone do not clearly and convincingly demonstrate the need for

the protective function privilege. 0 By comparison, in Jaffee, state
legislatures had previously considered the question of psychotherapist-

71. See id. The Court in Jaffee ascertained that state legislatures were fully aware of the need
to protect the integrity of the fact-finding functions of their courts. See id.
72. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076. The court acknowledged that the Office of the
Independent Counsel readily acknowledge the importance of Presidential safety. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. The court asserted that recognition of the privilege depended entirely upon the
Secret Service's ability to demonstrate that the privilege would enhance Presidential security. See
id.
75. See id. at 1076. The instant court found that all arguments made by the Secret Service,
other than assertions that the safety of the President was a profound national interest, were largely
based on speculation. See id.
76. Cf. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. at 1924,1934 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Jaffee,
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that the majority opinion merely mentioned the values
associated with a psychotherapist privilege. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice
Scalia, the mere mention of such values did not justify the importance of the privilege. See id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076.
78. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
79. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076. If the instant court increased the burden ofproof, due
to the absence of preyious consideration, it did not acknowledge the distinction. See id. In fact, the
instant court reasoned that a lack of precedent, due to the novelty of the instant case privilege, did
not weigh heavily against its recognition. See id
80. See id at 1079. The instant court alleged that the need for the protective function
privilege was scant and inconclusive. See id
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patient privilege and rendered it necessary."1 Thus, unlike the instant case,
the privilege in the Jaffee case had history behind it.82
The motive behind the instant court's demand for a clear and
convincing demonstration is seemingly driven by the lack of historical
consideration. 3 Yet, it is the absence of historical consideration which
seems to prevent the Secret Service from meeting the clear and convincing
standard of proof.' The instant court's reasoning is, hence, circular.
In addition to reading a clear and convincing standard into Rule 501,
the instant court departed from the language of the rule in another facet of
its decision.85 The purpose of Rule 501 is to authorize the courts to
recognize new evidentiary privileges.86 Similar to the Penn Court, the
instant court asserted that Congress could establish the proposed privilege
if it felt the privilege was appropriate.8 7 The Penn Court boldly refused to
recognize a peer review privilege based on the fact that Congress had
previously considered it but failed to recognize the privilege itself.8"
Although the instant court did not make its decision contingent upon
congressional approval, the responsibility of Congress was nonetheless
referenced. 9
According to Rule 501, congressional approval is not a prerequisite for
the court's recognition of a privilege.' Despite adhering to the Penn
decision, the instant court disregarded the language of Rule 501 by
transferring the privilege issue to Congress.91 In departing from the
language of Rule 501, both the Penn Court and the instant court declared
that it was up to Congress, not the courts, to create new privileges. 92
Thus, the instant court departed from the plain mandate of Rule 501 in
two ways. First, the instant court required a clear and convincing standard

81. See Jaffee, 116 S. CL at 1929. The Jaffee Court found that it was appropriate to consider
consistent policy determinations by state legislatures as indicators of recognition. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076.
84. See id. at 1079. The instant court alleged that the need for the protective function
privilege was scant and inconclusive. See id.
85. See id.The instant court concluded the case by leaving the privilege recognition question
to Congress. See id.
86. See Rubin v. United States, 119 S. CL 461 (1998), denying cert. to 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). Justice Breyer, in dissent, asserted that Rule 501 was adopted
precisely because Congress wished to leave privilege questions to the courts rather than attempt to
codify them. See id.(Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Cf Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079.
88. See Penn, 110 S. CL at 189.
89. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079.

90. See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 501.
91. See Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079.
92. Cf. Michael Grunwald, 'ProtectiveFunctionPrivilege' Is Proposed;DemocratsSeek to
Shield Secret Service, WASH. POST, September 17, 1998, at A17.
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of proof before the recognition of a new privilege. Second, the instant court
passed the responsibility of recognizing new privileges to Congress. Now
it is virtually impossible for new privileges to be acknowledged by the
courts because the courts view historical consideration or congressional
acceptance as essential for recognition. If the instant court had followed the
language of Rule 501, the court's own reason and experience would have
played a larger role. This reasoning would have prevented the court from
passing the buck, so to speak, to the state legislatures or Congress.
Ultimately, reason and experience would afford a new privilege the
opportunity it deserves to be recognized under Rule 501.
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